ObamaCare, Congress exceeded

Aug 12, 2011 by Editor Fred D

The 11 th Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta ruled on the appeal of ObamaCare from the District Court in FL. The ruling today states that the individual mandate is in fact unconstitutional but it reinstates the remainder the law. The Justices wrote that the mandate “can be severed from the remainder of the Act’s myriad reforms.”

Below are some of the highlights. Click here to read the Court issued opinion in the case of State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of HHS (11-11021-HH).

From Page 130: “In sum, the individual mandate is breathtaking in its expansive scope. It regulates those who have not entered the health care market at all. It regulates those who have entered the health care market, but have not entered the insurance market (and have no intention of doing so). It is over inclusive in when it regulates: it conflates those who presently consume health care with those who will not consume health care for many years into the future. The government’s position amounts to an argument that the mere fact of an individual’s existence substantially affects interstate commerce, and therefore Congress may regulate them at every point of their life. This theory affords no limiting principles in which to confine Congress’s enumerated power.”

From page 139: “For example, illegal aliens and other nonresidents are cost-shifters ($8.1 billion, or 18.9% of the $43 billion), 108 but they are exempted from the individual mandate entirely. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(3).”

From page 149: “The Supreme Court has expressed concern that “Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615, 120 S. Ct. at 1752; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 35–36, 125 S. Ct. at 2216–17 (Scalia, J., concurring); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 567–68, 115 S. Ct. at 1628–29, 1634; id. at 577, 115 S. Ct. at 1638–39 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that if Congress were to assume control over areas of traditional state concern, “the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory. The resultant inability to hold either branch of the government answerable to the citizens is more dangerous even than devolving too much authority to the remote central power” (citation omitted)). Coupled with this consideration, the Supreme Court recognizes that the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, 115 S. Ct. at 1633; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618–19, 120 S. Ct. at 1754; cf. Comstock, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1964; id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the police power “belongs to the States and the States alone”).”

From Page 167:  “But what Congress cannot do under the Commerce Clause is mandate that individuals enter into contracts with private insurance companies for the purchase of an expensive product from the time they are born until the time they die.”

From Page 168 and 9: “As to the individual mandate provision, however, Congress exceeded its enumerated commerce power. The structure of the Constitution interposes obstacles by design, in order to prevent the arrogation of power by one branch or one sovereign.”

From Page 206: “Further, the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s enumerated commerce power and is unconstitutional. This economic mandate represents a wholly novel and potentially unbounded assertion of congressional authority: the ability to compel Americans to purchase an expensive health insurance product they have elected not to buy, and to make them re-purchase that insurance product every month for their entire lives.”

From Page 207: “The individual mandate, however, can be severed from the remainder of the Act’s myriad reforms. The presumption of severability is rooted in notions of judicial restraint and respect for the separation of powers in our constitutional system. The Act’s other provisions remain legally operative after the mandate’s excision, and the high burden needed under Supreme Court precedent to rebut the presumption of severability has not been met.”